

How might the opioid epidemic affect children?

- Four main pathways (Feder et al., 2019):
 1. Opioid use results in child poisoning: Pediatric hospitalizations for opioid poisoning are rising (Winstanley and Stover, 2019)
 2. Opioid use occurs during pregnancy, affecting infant health: 24 states consider this child abuse (Guttmacher Institute, 2023)
 3. Opioid use results in deprivation of parental care and resources
 4. Opioid use results in separation from parents (due to incarceration, rehabilitation, or death): Opioid death rates are highest for individuals aged 25-44 (Buckles et al., 2020)

▶ Map of growth in foster care placements due to substance abuse

▶ Comparison with opioid supply

Directions for future research

- Reconcile different findings in the (early) literature
 - Evans et al. (2022) devotes a long appendix section to why PDMPs increase maltreatment but reduce foster care
- Why are some states with high opioid deaths (the Northeast corridor) not seeing large increases in foster care caseloads? Is this driven by policy?
- What is the effect of parental death from opioids on children's education and health? Are there spillovers to schools or teachers?
- Health and educational outcomes of foster youth
 - National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN) just released a new dataset with linked child welfare and Medicaid records (CCOULD)


Foster care trends

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	<i>Number in</i> 2019 (1)	<i>Share in</i> 2004 (2)	<i>Share in</i> 2019 (3)	<i>Difference</i> (3) – (2) (4)
<i>Panel A. Children ages 0–17 (N = 73,039,150)</i>				
Investigated for maltreatment	3,449,674	3.52	4.72	1.19
Confirmed as victims	652,253	0.97	0.89	–0.08
Entered foster care	250,311	0.41	0.34	–0.06
In foster care at end of fiscal year	419,760	0.68	0.57	–0.11
<i>Panel B. Removal reason for children entering care (N = 250,311)</i>				
Removed due to neglect		51.43	63.87	12.44
Removed due to parent substance use		23.34	38.15	14.81
Removed due to physical abuse		16.88	12.94	–3.94
Removed due to sexual abuse		6.33	3.96	–2.37


Disparities by state, 2019

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Disproportionality by state, 2019


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
Foster care placements involving substance abuse

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
Ratio of 2018 rate to 2004 rate



Comparison of substance abuse placements with opioid supply [▶ Back](#)




Foster care placements involving substance abuse



Per capita supply of Rx opioids in 2000 (Hou, 2021)

Trends in Age- and Sex-Adjusted Drug Deaths and Opioid Deaths, 1990-2018



Acemoglu (2023)

The model has the following structure:

- Representative household utility: $U = \ln C + \ln E$, depends on consumption (C , e.g., output) and externalities (E)

- Production function: $Y = \left[\gamma_1 Y_1^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + \gamma_2 Y_2^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$, where Y_1 and Y_2 are intermediate goods or sectors (e.g., preventative and curative medicine produce QALYs)

- Intermediate good $Y_j = X_j^\alpha R_j^{1-\alpha}$, where R_j are resources priced at q_j^R and X_j is variable input

- Variable input produced as: $X_j = \left(\int_0^{N_j} x_j(v)^{1-\beta} dv \right) \tilde{L}_j^\beta$, where \tilde{L}_j is specialized (inelastic) labor for that sector, N_j is range of technology v that provides quantity x_j in production

Acemoglu (2023) II

- Technology is produced by scientists S_j : $N_j = \tilde{\eta}_j \phi(S_j) S_j$, with $\phi(S_j) = S_j^{\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}}$ governing sectoral returns to scale
- $\delta > 0$ indicates increasing returns to scale (or path dependence in a dynamic setting)
- Price of machines in sector j given by: $q_j = (1 + \mu_j)\psi$, with constant marginal cost ψ and markup term μ_j
- Externality: $E = e^{-\sum \tilde{\tau}_j \ln N_j}$, $\tilde{\tau}$ representing externalities (negative ext. if > 0 , positive ext. if < 0)
- Goal: characterize the equilibrium levels of technology $n^{EQ} = N_2/N_1$

Acemoglu (2023) III

Social planner's problem is to allocate scientists to maximize total welfare:

$$\max_{S_1, S_2 \geq 0; S_1 + S_2 \leq \bar{S}} \ln Y(N_1, N_2) + \ln E(N_1, N_2)$$

Solves for the ratio of socially optimal and equilibrium technologies:

$$\frac{n^{SP}}{n^{EQ}} = \left[\left(\frac{\mu_2}{\mu_1} \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1 + \mu_2}{1 + \mu_1} \right) \left(\frac{1 - \tau_2}{1 - \tau_1} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{1 - \delta\sigma}}$$

Greater externalities and higher markups in sector j distort technology toward sector j .

Acemoglu (2023) IV


Calibration to health care: medical research and disease burden

- External parameters (Table 1): Variable input share (α), labor share (β), markups (μ_1, μ_2), estimated from De Loecker et al., 2020, externalities (τ_1, τ_2)
- Externalities: Returns (in terms of QALYs) to curative medicine (N_2) relative to preventative medicine (N_1):

$$\tilde{\tau}_2 = 1 - \frac{\text{QALY per dollar}_{curative}}{\text{QALY per dollar}_{preventative}} \sim 0.37$$

- Using estimated externalities, he finds $n^{SP} / n^{EQ} \sim 0.59$, with welfare effects at 18% of health care consumption

Figure 2
Trends in Opioid Shipments per Adult, 1997–2017



Impact of Drug Shipments Interacted with Pain and Despair on Local Areas

	<i>Interaction with opioid shipments</i>					<i>Interaction with national illicit death rate</i>	
	<i>Prescription opioid shipments (1997–2010)</i>					<i>Prescription opioid death rate (1997–2010)</i>	<i>Illicit opioid death rate (2008–2017)</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Interaction between national opioid shipments/illegal deaths and Pain</i>							
Percent of labor force claiming DI (1990)	86.10*** (10.73)				55.90 (41.86)	1.11* (0.60)	3.02* (1.57)
Self-reported joint pain prevalence		65.83** (31.26)			38.83 (32.22)	0.61** (0.28)	3.01*** (1.00)
<i>Despair</i>							
Share dissatisfied/very dissatisfied w/life			33.98 (28.26)		-70.94** (29.63)	-0.49 (0.33)	1.32 (1.08)
Extreme mental distress (30 days w/poor mental health)			140.86*** (28.27)	149.03*** (36.38)		1.27*** (0.38)	-0.09 (1.04)
<i>Opioid shipments</i>							
Oxycodone MME per capita, 1997–2010							4.47*** (1.11)

EXHIBIT 3**Associations between rates of child removal and drug prescriptions for all Florida counties, 2012-15**

	All causes	Parental drug abuse	Parental neglect
Opioids	0.09	0.07*	0.07**
Benzodiazepines	-0.12	-0.09	-0.06
Stimulants	0.10	0.02	0.03

SOURCE Authors' analysis of removal data for 2012-15 from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (see note 31 in text), prescription data from the Florida Drug-Related Outcomes Surveillance and Tracking System (see note 33 in text), population data from the Census Bureau (see note 32 in text), and data from the Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (see note 34 in text). **NOTES** The results are based on regression analysis. The dependent variable is the rate of child removals per 1,000 children ages 0-19 in a given Florida county. The prescription rate is calculated per 100 residents of all ages in a given Florida county. County and year fixed effects and county characteristics are included in all models. There are 268 observations, and observations are clustered by county. An unabridged version of this text is available in the online appendix (see note 37 in text). * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$

